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A RIGHT OF FAIR DISMISSAL:
ENFORCING A STATUTORY GUARANTEE
Janice R. Bellace*

Support for the concept that employees should be protected against
wrongful dismissal continues to grow in this country. 1 Yet, many advocates of protection have thus far refrained from venturing into the
legislative arena. Even though the movement to achieve this protection is still at an early stage, it is not too soon to focus on specific
proposals designed to translate ideals into protections. By failing to
coalesce behind a single proposal, supporters have retarded the progress of the movement. Without a proposal for specific legislation,
supporters lack a rallying point and legislators have nothing concrete
to debate. This Article attempts to meet this need by providing a proposal which not only satisfies the criteria of those advocating protection, but also responds to the concerns of those opposing such a right.
The United States' position on unfair dismissal is out of step with
the world standards reflected in the new Convention of the International Labour Organisation ("ILO") on termination of employment. 2
This Convention sets forth basic minimum protections which every nation should afford its working people - protections supported by most
major industrial nations, but which American workers do not yet
possess. The need for the United States to take action to comply with
world standards on unfair dismissal serves as a further impetus to
action. 3
Critics have asserted that comprehensive protection against wrongful
dismissal cannot be implemented in the United States without creating
an expensive bureaucracy and disrupting existing arbitration
* Assistant Professor of Legal Studies and Management, The Wharton School, University
of Pennsylvania. B.A., 1971, J.D., 1974, University of Pennsylvania; M. Sc., 1975, London
School of Economics.
I would like to thank Mr. Jean-Jacques Chevron and Mr. Alan Gladstone of the International
Labour Office, and Mr. Peter Carr, Labour Attache, British Embassy, Washington, D.C., for
their assistance. The research for this Article was supported in part by a grant from the Center
for International Management Studies of the Wharton School.
I. See generally Individual Rights in the Workplace: The At-Will Issue, 16 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 200 (1983); CoMM. ON LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW, At-Will Employment and the Problem
of Unjust Dismissal, 36 REc. A.B. CITY N.Y. 170 (1981).
2. 1982 Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the Employer,
reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, PROVISIONAL RECORD OF SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION No. 30A (June 21, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Convention].
3. See Summers, Introduction, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 201, 203 (1983).
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arrangements. 4 Nevertheless, other major industrialized nations, such
as Great Britain, have implemented unfair-dismissal protection without
erecting expensive bureaucracies. Many of these practices can be implemented by the individual states; indeed, this Article will show that
the machinery for implementing this right is already in place in every
state. This Article proposes the state-by-state adoption of a simple
statutory guarantee of protection from unjust discharge. This protection would be enforced through the same procedures presently used
for state unemployment compensation claims. The advantageous features
of this proposal are its low cost, comprehensive coverage, and ease
of implementation; features which make its timely adoption feasible.
Before setting out the proposed system, it will be useful to describe
the evolution and status of world standards on unfair dismissal and
how those standards can be implemented in a major industrialized nation. Part I discusses the ILO Convention and its substantive and procedural requirements. Part II describes how these ILO standards have
been implemented in Great Britain, a country with a labor law history
and practice quite similar to that found in the United States, and
highlights those practices capable of imitation. Part III explains how
every state can implement ILO unfair-dismissal standards and British
practices through existing state mechanisms. A description of the Pennsylvania unemployment claims procedure will illustrate that existing
systems require only minor modification to accommodate the proposed
statutory goal. This Article concludes that such a statutory guarantee,
implemented at the state level through existing procedures, is both timely
and feasible.
·
·
I.

WORLD STANDARDS ON UNFAIR DISMISSAL

The United States stands virtually alone among Western industrialized
countries in failing to provide a remedy for employees wrongfully
dismissed. Presently, there is no federal or state statutory protection
against unfair dismissal. 5 Notwithstanding much discussion on the erosion of the employment-at-will doctrine, 6 most state courts remain unwilling to entertain suits claiming that a discharge breached the employment contract unless the employee can prove that some contract term,
express promise, or formal employer policy supports the claim.' Because
4. See, e.g., Schauer, Due Process for Nonunionized Employees - Discussion, 32 PROC.
ANN. MEETING INDUS. REL. RESEARCH Assoc. 183 (1979).
5. For a brief survey of recent federal and state bills which have not been enacted, see The
Employment-At-Will Issue, Ill LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) No. 23, at 9-12 (Nov. 22, 1982) [hereinafter
cited as BNA REPORT].
6. See Note, Reforming At-will Employment Law: A Model Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
389, 394-402 (1983).
7. See BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 33-65 (survey of state court decisions).
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few Americans have entered into written employment contracts and
many companies lack formal disciplinary standards, the available
avenues of legal redress are effectively closed to most discharged
persons. 8
Protection against unfair dismissal need not come from governmental
sources; for instance, ILO standards could be met by using voluntary
arbitration where the arbitrator has the authority to award an effective remedy. Those Americans working under collective bargaining
agreements have adequate protection against unfair discharge because
of the use of certain voluntary procedures. 9 Yet, a mere twenty-five
percent of the work force is protected in this fashion; 10 for the remaining seventy-five percent, non-governmental protection is virtually
nonexistent. 11 Persons in this latter group seem to content themselves
with filing for unemployment compensation when they are dismissed,
knowing that they may be qualified for benefits so long as they were
not discharged for willful misconduct. The dearth of cases on wrongful
dismissal indicates that very few in this group file suit. This may be
because they are aware there is no legal right to be discharged for a
valid reason, or perhaps because the idea of undertaking the expense
of litigation cannot be realistically entertained by most persons who
have suddenly and unexpectedly become unemployed. 12
In any event, the American practice of not guaranteeing workers
a right of fair dismissal diverges from that of other industrialized countries. Indeed, the American position on whether employees should be
protected against wrongful dismissal is in a class by itself based on
8. For a review of the law on protection against unjust dismissal, see Blackburn, Restricted
Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of Employment At Will, I 7 AM. Bus. L.J.
467 (1980); Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40
OHIO ST. L.J. I (1979); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for
a Statute, 62 VA. L. REv. 481 (1976); Individual Rights in the Workplace: The At-Will Issue,
supra note I; Note, Job Security for the At Will Employee: Contractual Rights of Discharge
for Cause, 57 CHI. [-) KENT L. REV. 697 (1981).
9. According to the Bureau of National Affairs survey of 400 major collective bargaining
agreements, 990Jo of the contracts include voluntary grievance procedures. 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 51:1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as BNA SURVEY).
10. About 21 OJo of the labor force belongs to unions or employee associations. U.S. BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. No. 2000, HANDBOOK OF LABOR STATISTICS 1978, at 507 (1979).
Because collective bargaining agreements cover everyone in a bargaining unit, it is reasonable
to assume that some nonunion members are also covered by the protection against unjust discharge
found almost universally in collective agreements.
11. BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 3. The civilian labor force fluctuates in size but currently
includes about 110 million persons.
12. A review of many of the reported wrongful-dismissal cases brought in the last decade
reveals that most plaintiffs were managers, supervisors, or administrators. The person who typified
the average American employee (that is, one who had been employed in a job earning the median
salary received by a full-time employed male ($ 379/week) or female ($ 248/week), see BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, RELEASE No. 83-42, EARNINGS OF WORKERS AND
THEIR FAMILIES: FOURTH QUARTER 1982, Table 4 (1982)), was grossly underrepresented.
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the official United States position at the 1982 Conference of the ILO. 13
Representatives from 126 countries voted in June 1982 on whether a
Convention, "Termination of Employment at the Initiative of the
Employer," should be adopted. 14 Representatives from only seven countries voted against adoption of such a Convention, 1 5 with the negative
vote cast solely by the employers' representatives in six of these. The
United States was the only country in the world whose government
representative voted against the Convention.
ILO standards undoubtedly have the widest effect in determining
what is good industrial relations practice. Embodied in Conventions
and Recommendations, these standards are deemed to be pronouncements simply of what is acceptable, not of what is best practice. 16 The
ILO follows this policy of setting standards of minimum acceptable
behavior and of permitting flexible means of achieving the desired
behavior because this is viewed as the only practical method of encouraging member nations to respond voluntarily to the call for improvements
in employment practices. 1 7 Hence, a country which fails to comply with
ILO standards is not merely falling below some theoretical ideal: it
is failing to come up to the minimum level of acceptable behavior.
13. The International Labour Organisation was proposed in 1919 by a commission composed
of representatives of employers, workers, and governments. Their proposal was included in a
series of treaties following World War I. Surviving the demise of the League of Nations, the
!LO became, a specialized agency of the United Nations in 1946 according to the principles set
forth in the Declaration of Philadelphia, adopted May JO, 1944. On April 20, 1948, enough
ratifications and acceptances had been registered to bring the present constitution into effect.
All nations represented at the United Nations may belong to the !LO if they subscribe to the
principles of freedom of expression and association. The !LO has a permanent office in Geneva,
and a permanent secretariat. Each year, in June, delegates from the member nations meet and
conduct business. This is called the International Labour Conference. See A. PEASLEE, 2 INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS: CONSTITUTIONAL DOCUMENTS 990-92 (rev. 3d ed. 1974).
14. The final record vote on the Convention is found in the minutes of the June 22, 1982
morning session. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, PROVISIONAL REC. OF THE SIXTYEIGHTH SESSION No. 36 (Thirty-first Sitting), at 14-16 (June 23, 1982) [hereinafter cited as SIXTYEIGHTH SESSIONJ.
15. These countries were Brazil, Chile, Fiji, Grenada, Swaziland, Switzerland, and the United
States. Id. at 16.
16. At the annual meeting of the International Labour Conference, decisions in the form
of conventions, recommendations, or resolutions may be taken. Two-thirds of the delegates present and voting must support a proposed convention for it to be adopted. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
ORGANISATION CONST., art. 19(2). Each country has four voting delegates: two representing the
government, and one each representing employers and working people. Id. art. 3, para. I.
17. Once a convention has been adopted, all members are required to submit it to the appropriate national authority for the enactment of legislation or other action within one year.
If the national legislature consents to the ratification of the convention, the nation's formal ratification of the convention is communicated to the Director-General of the !LO. Signatory nations
assume an obligation to ensure that national law and practice comply with the provisions of
the ratified convention. The !LO has no enforcement mechanism with which it can compel signatory
nations to implement a convention. Periodically, the International Labour Office issues reports
on compliance with a given convention. The information in these reports is, for the most part,
supplied by the member nations. See id. art. 19, para. 5.
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The /LO Convention

The ILO Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the
Initiative of the Employer ("Convention") had its genesis in an ILO
Recommendation on Termination of Employment adopted in 1963. 18
Developments in national law and changes in national practice over
the intervening twenty years prompted the International Labour Conference to re-examine the 1963 Recommendation. It was felt that the
advancement of worker rights in countries throughout the world made
it an appropriate time to consider a Convention on the subject. 19 On
June 22, 1982, the Sixty-eighth Conference approved both a Convention and a Recommendation on termination of employment. 20 Only
the provisions of the Convention will be analyzed because it is the
general concept of employment protection embodied in the Convention, not the specific Recommendation details, which is relevant to this
discussion.
1. Scope of protection- As its title indicates, the Convention covers
not only individual discharge but also permanent layoffs affecting groups
of workers. Consequently, only Parts I and II, dealing with individual
discharge, will be discussed in this Article. It should be noted, however,
that much of the controversy over the adoption of this Convention
stemmed from employer resistance to protections granted under Part
III which deals with termination of employment for economic,
technological, or corporate structural reasons. 21
18. A recommendation is drafted in much more specific language than a convention. In effect, the recommendation suggests in detail how the worker protections should be interpreted
and applied. When the 1963 Recommendation on Termination of Employment was adopted in
1963, it was thought that two-thirds of the delegates would not support a convention on this
topic. The 1963 Recommendation is a direct forerunner of the 1982 Convention and much of
the Convention's language is taken from the earlier Recommendation. The text of the 1963 Recommendation is reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 67TH SESSION, 1982: REPORT
VIIJ(I) - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER [EIGHTH ITEM ON
THE AGENDA) 102-05 (1980).
19. At its November 1979 session, the Governing Body of the International Labour Organisation
decided to place an item on the agenda of the Sixty-seventh Session of the International Labour
Conference entitled "Termination of employment at the initiative of the employer." On June
22, 1981, the Conference resolved that this item would be placed on the agenda of the 1982
Conference with a view towards adoption of a convention or a recommendation. INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR CONFERENCE, 68TH SESSION, 1982: REPORT V(l) - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT
THE INJTJATTVE OF THE EMPLOYER [FIFTH ITEM ON THE AGENDA) I (1981). Employers favored
the flexibility of a recommendation while worker representatives preferred a more binding convention. Id. at 3-5.
20. See SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 14, No. 36, at 14-16 (adopting Convention); id.
(Thirty-second Sitting), at 19-21 (adopting Recommendation). The Recommendation is designed
to provide further guidance on the meaning of the principles contained in the Convention and
to suggest explicit standards capable of implementation.
21. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 67TH SESSION, 1982: REPORT VIll(2) - TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER [EIGHTH ITEM ON THE AGENDA]
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Article I allows for alternative methods of giving effect to the Convention, including legislation. 22 Whatever the method chosen, it must
offer the comprehensive coverage required by Article 2 which states:
''This Convention applies to all branches of economic activity and to
all employed persons. " 23 The exceptions permitted under Article 2 are
quite narrow, 24 and do not encompass the common exclusions in
American employment law such as public sector employees, those
employed in small businesses, supervisors, and managers. 25
2. Substantive reasons for fair discharge- The keystone of the Convention appears in Article 4 which provides that "[t]he employment
of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for
such termination connected with the capacity or conduct of the worker
or based on the operational requirements of the undertaking, establishment, or service." 26 This simple but forceful statement grants working
people a guarantee of elemental fairness at the workplace. The employer
may terminate employment, but not arbitrarily- or capriciously. The
enactment of such a fundamental employee right would undermine the
employment-at-will doctrine so widely used in the United States. This
was explicitly recognized by the American government and employers'
representatives who consistently opposed the adoption of Article 4. 27
85-129 (1981) (listing questions on the proposed Convention and government replies) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT VIII(2)]. The resistance of employers from certain countries, such as Britain,
would be difficult to understand unless this fact is known because the home countries already
complied completely with the unfair dismissal sections of the Convention.
22. Under Article I, ratifying nations are not required to enact legislation to implement the
Convention. Only if the protections specified are not already applicable by means of collective
agreements, arbitration awards, court decisions, or other national practices must the ratifying
nation enact legislation or promulgate regulations. See Convention, supra note 2, art. I.
23. Id. art. 2(1 ).
24. Under Article 2, persons on fixed-term contracts can be excluded, id. art. 2(2)(a), but
ratifying nations are directed to ensure that this exclusion is not abused, id. art. 2(3). Persons
serving a probationary period at the beginning of employment may also be excluded from certain
parts of the Convention's protection. Id. art. 2(2)(b).
It has been claimed that American employer_s won the right to have managers excluded from
the coverage of the Convention. See BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 (quoting Paul Weinberg,
member of the American employers' delegation). Such an interpretation overstates the exclusion
permitted by Article 2 that member nations may exclude "other limited categories" of employees
where "special problems of a substantial nature" occur because of "particular conditions of
employment" or the size or nature of the employer. Convention, supra note 2, art. 2(3).
25. For example, the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980), applies only to private sector employees and "employee" is defined by the Act to
exclude supervisors, farm workers, and domestics, id. § 152(3). Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to e-17-(1976 & Supp. IV 1980), dealing with equal employment
opportunity, does not extend protection to those employed by employers having fewer than 15
employees, id. § 2000e(b).
26. Convention, supra note 2, art. 4.
27. For instance, in 1982 the American government suggested that the clause be moved from
the Convention to the Recommendation. See Report of the Committee on Termination of Employment, SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 14, No. 30, at 4 (June 19, 1982). The American employers'
representative supported this amendment. Id. The United States ultimately abstained in the voting

WINTER

1983)

Statutory Fair Dismissal

213

The drafters were aware that this guarantee of just cause for discharge
might be diluted by narrow interpretations given to the phrase "valid
reasons for termination" in Article 4. To avoid this pitfall, they included Article 5 which lists several reasons ratifying nations should
not accept as a valid basis for termination. Among these were dismissal
based on union activity or filing complaints against the employers with
governmental bodies, or because of a worker's race, color, sex, national origin, or religion. 28 When the United States government was
asked for its opinion in 1980 on this list of invalid reasons for termination, it did not quibble with any item on the list; it even suggested
adding "handicap" to the list. 29 During the debates on the Convention, neither the American government nor the employers' representative objected to any specific item in the list. In addition, both argued
that Article 4 should be deleted because Article 5 was, on its own,
a sufficient guarantee against arbitrary discharges.
This acquiescence and cooperation on the part of the American
government and American employers' representatives was surprising
because the list of reasons in Article 5, taken in conjunction with Article 4's fundamental guarantee, covers items not yet found in American
law. The Convention thus would provide significantly greater protection than that currently afforded American workers. For instance,
although the substantive protection afforded by Article 5(a) and (b)
is covered by section 8(a) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
NLRA extends only to the private sector and only to that portion of
the workforce defined as "employees" for the purposes of the Act. 30
Admittedly, certain federal regulatory statutes protect those filing
on the Recommendation. See id. No. 36 (Thirty-second Sitting), at 21. The primary spokesman
for the American employers' group on this issue, Paul Weinberg of American Express, stated
in the final debate preceding the vote that employers opposed the Convention, "basically because
its very concept . . . erodes the principle of termination at will." Id. No. 35 (Twenty-ninth
Sitting), at 4 (June 22, 1982).
28. The following, inter alia, shall not constitute valid reasons for termination:
(a) union membership or participation in union activities outside working hours or,
with the consent of the employer, within working hours;
(b) seeking office as, or acting or having acted in the capacity of, a workers'
represent;llive;
(c) the filing of a complaint or the participation in proceedings against an employer
involving alleged violation of laws or regulations or recourse to competent administrative
authorities;
(d) race, colour, sex, marital status, family responsibilities, pregnancy, religion, political
opinion, national extraction or social origin;
(e) absence from work during maternity leave.
Convention, supra note 2, art. 5.
29. See REPORT VIII(2), supra note 21, at 37.
30. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. In addiiion to the statutory exclusions cited
supra note 25, there are several judicially created exclusions from coverage, most notably for
persons deemed to be rpanagerial employees. See, e.g., NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672
(1980) (college professors); NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (salesmen).
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charges against their employer under the statute, but this protection
is hardly comprehensive. 31 In addition, like Article 5(d) of the Convention, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects most American
employees against discharge based on race, color, sex, pregnancy,
religion, or national extraction. 32 Title VII, however, does not extend
to discharge based on social origin (class), political opinion, family
responsibilities, or marital status. 33 Finally, women absent from employment after childbirth are protected only to the extent that their absence
is caused by a physical inability to return to work and then only if
their employer's poli<::y on absence due to sickness includes such an
absence. If the United States would implement Article 5 these wide
gaps in the present protection afforded American workers would be
filled.
The Convention also addresses the important disciplinary issue of
temporary absence from work because of injury or illness. Under Article
6, such absences do not constitute a valid reason for termination. 34
Article 6 refrains, however, from stipulating how long an employer
must keep a job open for an ill employee; rather, the Convention leaves
it to each ratifying nation to take into account national law and practice in deciding how this protection should be applied. 35 If the United
States were to comply with Article 6, an area of substantial uncertainty would be settled. Although it is generally accepted in the United
States that a temporary absence should not give rise to discharge, there
apparently exist no guidelines on employer practice in this area. 36 In
seeking to ascertain how long a job will be kept open for an ill employee,
research reveals that there are no set rules, or even strong employer
norms. 37 The decision thus remains a unilateral determination by the
employer, with non-union employees usually having no means of
challenging a discharge based on absence.
3. Procedural safeguards- The Convention supports the notion
that discharged workers should have a right to defend themselves before
punishment is imposed. Article 7 states that a dismissal based on the
31. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1%4, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980); see also National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
32. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
33. This assumes that the employer's policies are sex-blind, for instance that married women
and men with children are treated similarly. See, e.g., Yuhas v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 562
F.2d 496 (7th Cir. 1977) (finding valid a company rule prohibiting employment of a married
couple as long as couple given choice of which person should leave).
34. Convention, supra note 2, art. 6(1).
35. Id. art. 6(2).
36. In response to a 1980 !LO survey, the United States agreed with the principle that temporary absence dne to illness or injury should not be grounds for discharge. See REPORT Vlll(2),
supra note 21, at 39.
37. See BNA SURVEY, supra note 9, 62:6-7, 62:901 (discussing variations in sick-leave contract provisions).
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employee's conduct or performance should not take effect until the
employee has had an opportunity to respond to the allegations, ''unless
the employer cannot reasonably be expected to provide this
opportunity." 38 This can be seen as merely good personnel management practice. Yet, at present, there is no right to a pre-discharge
disciplinary interview in the United States. 39 Besides preventing baseless
discharges, Article 7 has another attraction: it alerts the employee to
the reason for discharge, thereby permitting a defense to be prepared
more easily.
A critical aspect of the Convention's guarantee is contained in Article 8 which provides that workers who believe they have been unfairly
discharged should be able to challenge their discharge before an ''impartial body" such as a court, tribunal, or arbitrator. 40 Although Article 8 does not expressly mandate a hearing, the requirement that
employees have a right to challenge their dismissal before an impartial
body strongly implies that some type of hearing is contemplated. The
United States government opposed any hearing requirement. It was
displeased even with the moderately worded final form of Article 8
because it believed that reliance on private dispute resolution mechanisms
was preferable. 41
The Convention also mitigates the difficult position in which the
discharged worker is placed at a hearing by modifying the burden of
proof. Article 9 bolsters the position of the employee by providing
alternatives "[i]n order for the worker not to have to bear alone the
burden of proving that the termination was not justified. " 42 The ratifying nation may either place the burden on the employer to come
forward with a valid reason for the discharge, or require that the impartial body reach a conclusion based on the evidence, 43 thereby placing the burden of proof on neither party. 44 Far from being a matter
Convention, supra note 2, art. 7.
See, e.g., Brown, Limiting Your Risks in the New Russian Roulette-Discharging
Employees, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 380 (Winter 1982-83). In unionized companies, summary
discharge is rare except in instances of egregious misconduct. In such companies, the practice
of a pre-discharge investigation and interview may reflect employer awareness that arbitrators
often take into account whether an employer gave a warning or conducted a pre-discharge investigation in determining whether the discharge was fair.
40. Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(1).
41. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, PROVISIONAL RECORD OF THE SIXTY-SEVENTH
SESSION No. 39 (Thirty-first Sitting), at 24 (June 23, 1981) [hereinafter cited as SIXTY-SEVENTH
SESSION].
42. Convention, supra note 2, art. 9(2).
43. Id.
44. The original draft of the proposed Convention had placed the burden of proof on the
employer. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 68TH SESSION, 1982: REPORT V(2) TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT THE INITIATIVE OF THE EMPLOYER [FIFrH ITEM ON THE AGENDA]
70 (proposed text). The employers' representatives vigorously opposed this, and the Committee
on Termination of Employment devised the compromise which appears in the adopted Convention. See BNA REPORT, supra note 5, at 15 (statement of Paul Weinberg).
38.
39.
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of mere procedure, this requirement amounts to an important substantive protection in itself: employees are no longer placed in the difficult
position of proving that the employer's reason for discharge was invalid, a task usually requiring employees to prove that their work record
was spotless. Article 9 thus creates further support for the fundamental guarantee. Employers should have a valid reason for dismissal;
therefore, it is not unduly onerous to require employers to specify that
reason.
Preferring voluntary, private arrangements to mandatory unfairdismissal procedures, the United States government proposed that the
requirements of Articles 8 and 9 be placed in the non-binding Recommendation, rather than in the Convention, to provide nations with "considerable flexibility" in the means of implementing the Convention. 45
The Article 9 provision that the employer be required to come forward with a valid reason for an employee's dismissal was specifically
criticized by an American employers' advisor as one of the major areas
in which the Convention severely curtailed the flexibility employers
believe they must have to control their operations. 46

B.

American Position on the /LO Convention

An examination of the voting on the Convention reveals the isolation of the United States from other highly industrialized, free countries. The Convention's strongest supporters were countries whose
government, employers' and workers' representatives all voted in favor
of the Convention, such as Canada, West Germany, France, and
Japan. 47 Strong support also came from countries such as the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands where, though the employers' representatives abstained to signal disapproval with Part III of the Convention,
support for the unfair-dismissal parts was nevertheless total. 48 In only
three Western, highly industrialized countries, did support for unfairdismissal protection fall below the level of strong support: Australia,
Switzerland, and the United States. Not surprisingly, workers' representatives from all three countries voted in favor of the Convention. Both
the Australian government representatives and employers' representative
abstained. The Swiss government representatives voted in favor, while
the employers' representative voted against. The American government
representative and employers' representative both voted against the Con45. SIXTY-SEVENTH SESSION, supra note 41 at 24.
46. Id. (statement of Mr. Weinberg).
47. See SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 14, No. 36, at 14-16. Other industrialized countries
in this group were Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Norway, and Sweden. Id.
48. See id. at 16. Other Western industrialized countries voting similarly were Austria, Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Id.
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vention. No other country in the world displayed such official rejection of the Convention. 49
The American government's reasons for voting against the Convention are noteworthy. As mentioned, many of the employers' representatives, who otherwise approved of much of the Convention, voted
against its adoption or abstained because of the proposed restraints
on the employer's ability to dismiss workers incident to a plant closure
or manpower reduction. so The United States, however, was the only
major nation opposing the Convention to take an official position during
the debates which struck at the Convention's essential core concept
of just cause for discharge. st It objected to the Convention because
of the mandatory nature of certain substantive provisions, because
employers were required to have a valid reason for discharging an
employee, and because of the required post-discharge appeal to an impartial body with the employer asked to put forward some reason for
discharge. s 2
Although ILO Conventions cannot be legally enforced against member
nations, most Western, industrialized nations do take seriously their
obligations as ratifying nations. s3 Moreover, developing countries often
look to ILO Conventions when attempting to upgrade national industrial
relations practices and employment standards. These factors may have
prompted American employers to take a more vigorous stance in opposing this Convention which they knew would not be ratified by the United
States. s4 Apparently, many American companies did not want to be
required by law to behave at home as they must abroad. The presence
of unfair-dismissal legislation, however, does not seem to be a disincentive to corporate investment. For instance, more American companies
operate in Great Britain than in any other foreign country, yet British
law on unfair dismissal completely complies with the requirements of
49. See id.
50. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
51. The United States has ratified only seven Conventions, all dealing with maritime matters.
The American government has taken the position that the federal legislature is without the power
to bind the states in matters covered by Conventions. This has not, however, prevented the United
States from supporting Conventions and voting in favor of their adoption; hence, the vigorous
opposition of the United States to the Convention is significant.
52. See SIXTY-EIGHTH SESSION, supra note 14, No. 35, at 4-5; see also U.S. Council, Termination of Employment, INT'L LAB. AFF. REP., 1982, No. 3, at 5.
53. For example, the United Kingdom has ratified more than 80 ILO conventions and most
European nations have ratified more than 50. The United States has ratified only seven.
54. See, e.g., U.S. Council, supra note 52, at 4-6 (U.S. Council for International Business
urging its member companies to notify their overseas subsidiaries about the content of the new
Convention so that an appropriate lobbying effort at national level can be made); BNA REPORT,
supra note 5, at 14 (quoting a letter from Paul Weinberg, lead American employers' advisor
on the Convention, to the chairman of the industrial relations committee of the U.S. Council
for International Business, citing the potential impact on overseas subsidiaries as a major reason
for making every effort to block the adoption of a Convention).
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the new ILO Convention.

II.

BRITISH LAW AND PRACTICE

When a country has gone without any protection against unfair
dismissal for a considerable period of time, the reasons why it decides
to grant a right of fair dismissal, particularly in light of the cost of
enforcing such a right, are illuminating. In Britain's case, there were
two major reasons. First, it was accepted that Britain should take action to comply with the standards promulgated by the ILO. 55 Second,
it was widely believed that the lack of peaceful dispute-resolution
mechanisms in discharge cases led to work stoppages. 56 Because both
views commanded non-partisan support, it was not surprising that
Parliament promptly acted on the idea of granting a right to fair
dismissal. The process was expedited by tacking unfair-dismissal provisions onto major, comprehensive industrial relations legislation already
proposed.
Effective enforcement of this new protection was easily guaranteed
through the use of a special system of tribunals set up to provide accessible, inexpensive, and quick resolution to discharge cases. This would
free the regular comt system from the potential clogging effect of an
unfair-dismissal caseload. Furthermore, it would relieve complaints
about the burden of utilizing regular court procedures, an expensive
and time-consuming process likely to daunt discharged workers. Uniformity in the development of the law would be provided by appellate
courts.

A.

Pressures for Legislative Action

Britain did not enact legislation on unfair dismissal until 1971.
American workers today would be familiar with the situation prevailing in Britain prior to that time. There was no statutory or judicially
created right to fair dismissal. Neither were there any governmentally
supported procedures enabling employees to protest their dismissal. 57
An employee who was dismissed could sue for breach of contract in
the regular civil courts, but without an express contractual clause on
fair treatment, such litigation was unlikely to be successful. Employers
were required to provide each employee with a written employment
contract containing terms covering specified items, such as the notice

55.
56.
57.

See WmTE PAPER ON INTERNATIONAL LABOUR
See infra note 61 and accompanying text.

CONFERENCE, CMD.

For example, there was no government mediation service.

No. 2548, at 6-8 (1964).
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period under the Contracts of Employment Act of 1963. 58 This "protection," however, did not significantly improve the position of
employees. Most employees worked under a contract with an indefinite
term, and an employer wishing to dismiss such an employee merely
had to give proper notice of termination for the dismissal to be lawful. 59
No reason for terminating the contract was required for these dismissals.
Private methods of resolving disagreements in discharge cases were
unusual. Although the rate of unionization was much higher in Britain than in the United States, 60 and despite the fact that the union
movement was very strong, arbitration as a means of resolving
disagreements over the validity of individual dismissals had not
developed to any measurable extent. If the discharged person's coworkers were sufficiently dissatisfied with the basis for the discharge,
the shop steward would approach management in an effort to work
out a satisfactory solution. If these efforts failed, workers would typically threaten, and if necessary, actually engage in, an immediate work
stoppage. To persuade the strikers to resume working, management
would often enter into some form of negotiation and take_ some action
to resolve the crisis. This method of resolving discharge disputes accorded great weight to the work group's sense of fairness and solidarity, and it undoubtedly offered very prompt remedial action without
government intervention. Aside from these positive features, however,
there were some distinct disadvantages to this method of dispute
resolution. 61 Short, unannounced work stoppages by small groups of
workers caused not only an immediate loss of production but also a
decline in the overall reputation of British firms for timely performance.
In addition, if the discharged person's work group lacked strike power,
there was, for all practical purposes, no way to challenge the discharge.
58. Ch. 49. This was significantly amended by the Contracts of Employment Act, 1972, ch.
53. The written statement had to be given to the employee within the first 13 weeks of employment. Id.
59. At present, the notice period varies from one to 12 weeks depending upon the employee's
length of service with the company. See Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch.
44, § 49(1). The statute sets the minimum notice; the contract may increase the notice period.
An employer wishing to terminate an employee immediately can fulfill its contractual obligations
by paying the employee the amount the employee would have earned during the notice period.
Id. §§ 50-51 & Sched. 3.
60. It has been estimated that in 1970, 38% of white-collar employees and 52.7% of bluecollar employees in Great Brita_in were union members. See Bain & Price, Union Growth and
Employment Trends in the U.K., /964-1970, 10 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 366, 378 (1972). In the
United States, 27.3% of the nonagricultural labor force were union members in 1970. The figure
went up to 300/o if persons belonging to associations, such as the National Educational Association, were counted as members. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, BULL. 2079, DIRECTORY
OF NATIONAL UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ASSOCIATIONS, 1979-59 (1980). See also Freeman & Medoff,
New Estimates of Private Sector Unionism in the United States, 32 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV.
143 (1979).
61. See McCarthy, The Nature of Britain's Strike Problem, 8 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 224, 235-36
(1970).
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This state of affairs changed in 1964 when the British government
announced that it had accepted and would conform to the 1963 Recommendation on Termination of Employment that had been adopted by
the ILO the previous year. 62 The government then formally consulted
employers' and employees' groups on how to provide effective
safeguards against unfair dismissal. A committee of the Minister of
Labour's National Joint Advisory Council studied existing practices
and issued its report in 1967. 63 The committee's findings depicted a
situation similar to that now existing in the United States. The report
noted that, in general, employees had no legal protection against
dismissal for bad reasons or for no reason at all. 64 The committee found
that formal personnel policies covering dismissal procedures were not
widespread, with those in existence found mostly in larger firms. 65 In
unionized companies, disputes procedures were agreed upon and could
be utilized in discharge disputes, but the committee observed that their
comprehensiveness and effectiveness varied greatly. 66
While this committee was studying the issue of protection against
unfair dismissal, another government committee was touching upon
the same topic as part of a wide-ranging inquiry. In 1965, the Royal
Commission on Trade Unions and Employers' Associations, commonly
called_ the Donovan Commission, was established to consider the whole
field of labor-management relations with a particular focus on the law
affecting labor relations. 67 The work of the Donovan Commission received substantial publicity and, unlike the National Joint Advisory
Committee's report, its recommendations were designed for legislative
implementation.
In its 1968 Report, the Donovan Commission found unsatisfactory
the then-existing situation whereby protection against unfair dismissal
existed only at the employer's discretion. 68 Whereas the National Joint
Advisory Committee had refrained from recommending statutory protection against unfair dismissal, a majority of the Donovan Commis62. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
63. See MINISTRY OF LABOUR, DISMISSAL PROCEDURES (H.M.S.O. 1967).
64. Id. para. 13.
65. Id. paras. 69, 72.
66. Id. para. 72.
67. The establishment of the Donovan Commission was prompted by the conviction that
the government should act to improve the system of industrial relations then generally perceived
to be in trouble. Whether this public perception was accurate has been disputed. Compare McCarthy, supra note 61, at 235-36 (arguing that there was a substantial problem), with Turner, Is
Britain Really Strike Prone?: A Review of the Incidence, Character and Costs of Industrial Conflict, Occasional Paper No. 20 (Cambridge Univ. Press May 1969) (claiming that the strike problem was exaggerated), cited in McCarthy, supra note 61, at 224 n.l. After a thorough examination of the statistical evidence, one author concluded that Lord McCarthy was correct. See Silver,
Recent British Strike Trends: A Factual Analysis, 11 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 66, 94-98 (1973).
68. ROYAL COMM'N ON TRADE UNIONS AND EMPLOYERS' Ass'Ns 1965-1968, REPORT, CMD.
No. 3623, para. 526 (1968).
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sion concluded that statutory protection was the desirable response to
this situation. 69 To support their conclusion, the Commission observed:
"[i]f statutory protection is to be afforded against arbitrary dismis~al
when the reason for it happens to be race or colour, then protection
should be afforded against dismissal for other no •less arbitrary
reason. mo The primary advantage of a statutory guarantee, in the Commission's opinion, was "an immediate raising of standards to a much
more satisfactory level." 11

B.

Implementing Statutory Protection

The Donovan Report generated intense controversy; both the Labour
Party and the Conservative Party proposed remedial labor legislation
varying on most major issues. The sole exception was protection against
unfair dismissal which was quickly implemented in the Industrial Relations Act, 1971. 12 Section 22 of that Act declared: "[i]n every employment to which this section applies every employee shall have the right
not to be unfairly dismissed by his employer. " 73 Reflecting the volatility
of British labor relations, labor legislation in Britain since 1971 has
not been stable. Acts have been passed, then repealed, and the repealing legislation itself has been extensively amended. 7 4 This notwithstanding, the unfair-dismissal protection, now codified in the Employment
Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, 75 stands unchanged after twelve
years, 76 a tribute to its enduring popularity and effectiveness.
The British legislation set forth in Part V of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act provides Americans with a practical lesson
69. See id. paras. 533-544. The minority believed that voluntary procedures should be improved.
This same difference of opinion had caused the representatives from the Confederation of British
Industry and those from the Trades Union Congress to deadlock a year earlier. See id. ~ 531.
70. Id. para. 543.
71. Id. para. 539.
72. Ch. 72.
73. Id. § 22. In Britain, the term "wrongful dismissal" means that an employee has been
dismissed by an employer who has failed to comply in some way with the terms of the employment contract. The term "unfair dismissal" covers a much broader spectrum of employer conduct. In alleging unfair dismissal, employees need not base their arguments on a clause in the
employment contract. See Engineering Employers' Federation, Industrial Relations Bill: Questions and Answers for Management 8 (Mar. 1971).
74. The Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, enacted under a Conservative government,
was repealed by the Labour government with the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974,
ch. 52. The subsequent Conservative government has extensively amended the latter statute with
the Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, and the Employment Act, 1982, ch. 46.
75. Ch. 44. Parts of statutes which dealt with employment protection matters, such as unfair
dismissal, maternity benefit, and redundancy payments, were consolidated into one statute. Most
of the 1978 Act was taken from the Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71.
76. When the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, was repealed by the incoming Labour government in 1974, only the sections on unfair dismissal were re-enacted. See Trade Union and Labour
Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, sched. I, pt. II.
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in implementing safeguards against unfair dismissal. An affirmatively
stated employee right, appropriately limited grounds for discharge, comprehensive coverage, a burden of proof not placed exclusively on the
employee, and impartial appeal tribunals all combine to render the
British legislation in compliance with the new ILO Convention on Termination of Employment. 77
1. The guarantee- After guaranteeing the employee a right not
to be dismissed unfairly, the statute specifies valid reasons for discharge.
Section 57(2) states that the reason must be related to the employee's
conduct, qualifications, or capability to perform the work, 78 or that
there must be "some other substantial reason of a kind such as to
justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the
employee held. " 79 Section 57 lists the generally applicable considerations in a discharge case. Other sections deal with dismissals relating
to union membership, union activism, pregnancy, and maternity leave. 80
Dismissal based on race and sex are outlawed by other, specialized
statutes, but are mentioned in Part V of the Employment Protection
(Consolidation) Act so that the issue of compensation in a discrimination case can be considered. 81
2. Burden of proof- Although technically a matter of procedure,
the placement of the burden of proof in a discharge case fundamentally
affects the substantive guarantee provided employees in unfair-dismissal
legislation. 82 Amended several times, the current burden of proof section requires the tribunal, in deciding whether the dismissal was fair,
to consider the reason given by the employer for the discharge. 83
Tribunals must decide whether the employer acted reasonably in treating

77. This statement refers only to Parts I and II of the Convention. See supra note 21 all
and accompanying text.
78. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 57(2)(a), (b). Subsection
(c) deals with redundancy.
79. Id. § 57(1)(b).
80. For each of these reasons, there is a qualifying period an employee must have served
before a claim can be made. Some attach immediately, such as race and sex discrimination.
The all-purpose claim, under section 57, however, requires the longest qualifying period. See
id. § 64.
81. See id. § 76.
82. It is generally thought that placing the burden of proof on the employer makes it easier
for employees to win claims. Hence, Labour governments have favored placing the entire burden
on the employer while Conservative governments have opposed this.
83. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 57(3), amended by Employment Act, 1980, § 6. The section states in part:
[T]he determination of the question whether the dismissal was fair or unfair, having
regard to the reason shown by the employer, shall depend on whether in the circumstances
(including the size and administrative resources of the employer's undertaking) the
employer acted reasonably or unreasonably in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee; and that question shall be determined in accordance with equity
and the substantial merits of the case.

WINTER

1983)

Statutory Fair Dismissal

223

the proffered reason as sufficient grounds for discharge. 84
Employers previously were required to satisfy the tribunal that they
had acted reasonably. 85 Now, the burden on the employer is something
less than the conventional burden of proof, yet the burden is not shifted
to the employee to prove that the dismissal was unfair. 86 In this regard,
the British legislation remains in compliance with the ILO Convention. 87
Importantly, the employer is still required to come forward at the hearing with the reason for the discharge. The British practice, therefore,
places discharged persons in a very different and less onerous position
than their American counterparts who must, as plaintiffs, prove that
the em.ployer breached the employment contract.
3. Coverage- Protection under the British statute is comprehensive; nearly all full-time employees are protected against unfair dismissal
once with a company for some requisite period - generally, one year
of service. 88 In firms with less than twenty employees, employees are
not protected until they have accumulated two years of service with
the company. 89 Probationary periods of employment are thus accepted,
and until they expire and statutory protection vests, employers retain
the right to dismiss new employees at will. 90 Persons employed under
fixed-term contracts may also be protected, depending on the term of
their contracts. When the contract of a person employed for a fixed
term expires without being renewed, that person can complain of unfair dismissal only if the contractual term was for more than one year. 9 '
84. If there was more than one reason that motivated the employer to dismiss the claimant,
the tribunal decides whether the principal reason was sufficient. See id. § 57(1).
85. The 1978 Act imposed this requirement. See id. It was amended by the 1980 Act. See
supra note 83.
86. See supra note 83.
87. See Convention, supra note 2, art. 9.
88. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 64. The requisite period
had been 26 weeks since 1974. See Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, sched.
I, pt. II, para. IO. It was lengthened by the Conservative government in 1979 to limit the numbers
of dismissed workers who could make a claim. See Unfair Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying
Period) Order, 1979 STAT. INST. No. 959. Part-time employees are those who usually work less
than 16 hours per week.
89. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 64A, amended by Employment Act, 1980, .ch. 42, § 8(2).
90. Both political parties accept the validity of a probationary period but differ on how long
this period should be. It has been asserted that many workers in high turnover industries are
effectively excluded from protection by a one-year probationary period. See R. LEWIS & B. SIMPSON, STRIKING A BALANCE? EMPLOYMENT LAW AFTER THE 1980 ACT 27 (1981). See also infra
note 81 and accompanying text.
91. See Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, §§ 55(2)(b), 142(1), amended
by Employment Act, 1980, ch. 42, § 8(2). In some European countries, such as France, it is
common for certain employees, such as secretaries, to be employed for years under short-term
contracts which automatically renew unless either party gives notice. Because this practice is not
common in Britain, these statutory sections have not been subject to frequent use. In addition,
British employers have not attempted to circumvent the unfair dismissal protections by placing
employees on short, fixed-term contracts.
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Aside from these service requirements, the exclusions from coverage
are quite narrow. 92 There is no public sector /private sector distinction,
nor is there any general exemption for small employers. Persons who
normally work outside Great Britain 93 and those employed by their
spouse 94 are not protected. Finally, persons over normal retirement age
are not covered by the statute. 95
4. Remedies- In formulating remedies, the British adopted a
pragmatic approach. The intent was not to inflict serious pecuniary
damage on companies, but solely to compensate employees fairly for
their loss and to provide a sufficient financial disincentive to employers.
The remedy for unfair dismissal is either reinstatement or reemployment, if the complainant so desires and the tribunal believes
it is appropriate, or a damages award. 96 Reinstatement to the former
position or re-employment in another job with the same employer,
though permitted under the statute, is not common. 97 In most cases,
compensation is the remedy. 98 This may result from the widely held
belief that persons who have been discharged will not easily fit back
in their former workplace and that, in most instances, new employment elsewhere is better for all concerned. 99 In this regard, it should
be noted that seniority is not nearly as important a factor in British
employment as it is in the United States. 100
The damages award has two components: a "basic" award and a
"compensatory" award. 101 The basic award is computed according to
a statutory formula which takes into account the complainant's length
of service, weekly pay, and age. The statute places a maximum limit
on the basic award, which, in effect, is a liquidated damages provision. 102
92. Seamen, dockworkers, and persons employed by police departments are not covered by
the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, but they are protected against unfair dismissal
under industry-specific legislation and regulations. Id. §§ 144, 145, 146(2).
93. Id. § 141.
94. Id. § 146(1).
95. Id. § 64(1)(b). The normal retirement age for men is 65; for women, 60. Id. The Act
contains an exception to this rule: if a person over retirement age is dismissed for an "inadmissible" principal reason, the Act applies. See id. § 64(3).
96. Id. § 68.
97. See Dickens, Hart, Jones & Weekes, Re-employment of Unfairly Dismissed Workers:
The Lost Remedy, 10 !Nous. L.J. 160 (1981); Williams & Lewis, Legislating for Job Security:
The British Experience of Reinstatement and Reengagement, 8 EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 482 (Winter
1982-83).
98. Dickens, Hart, Jones & Weekes, supra note 97, at 161.
99. See id. at 163-66. Based on a field study, the authors questioned the accuracy of this
assumption.
100. For example, length of vacation and selection order for shifts, overtime, and vacation
are not usually based on seniority in Great Britain. Lay-offs, however, are usually done on a
"last-in, first-out" basis.
101. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 72.
102. At the time the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act was passed, the average
wage for a full-time male worker was £5200 (about $10,000). The statute set the maximum basic
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Section 74 states that the compensatory award be "such amount as
the tribunal considers just and equitable in all the circumstances having regard to the loss sustained by the complainant in consequence
of the dismissal so far as that loss is attributable to action taken by
the employer." 103 In deciding whether to make a compensatory award,
and what amount to award, 104 the tribunal may take into account the
extent to which the complainant caused or contributed to the loss. 105
The compensatory award is designed to cover expenses, financial loss,
and other items. Where appropriate, emotional distress and injury to
feelings may be compensated. The compensatory award, however, was
not designed to be a windfall. When enacted, the statutory maximum
amount allowed as a compensatory award was pegged at the average
yearly salary of the full-time male industrial worker. 106
5. Complaints procedure- One of the most attractive features of
the British legislation is a complaints procedure designed to minimize
legalistic formality and to resolve cases with finality at the earliest possible stage. Persons who believe that they have been unfairly dismissed
may file a complaint under the statute. Complaint forms, which are
available at local offices of the Department of Employment, must be
filed within three months of the discharge. 107 After the complaint is
filed, an employee of the independent government agency, the Advisory,
Conciliation and Arbitration Service ("ACAS"), will meet with the
complainant and the employer and attempt to secure agreement to a
conciliated ,settlement. The efforts of the ACAS conciliation officer
are an integral part of the statutory plan. 108 On average, about sixty
percent of complaints are disposed of at the conciliation stage, either
because a conciliated settlement was reached or because the complainant withdrew the claim. 109 The remaining forty percent of claims proaward possible at £3000 and the maximum compensatory award (in normal dismissal claims under
section 57) at £5200. See id. §§ 73-75, sched. 14, sec. 8(1). The maximum award has recently
been increased to £7500. See 1982 STAT. INST. No. 1868.
103. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 74(1).
104. The compensatory award must be reduced by the amount the complainant has earned
or would have earned had the complainant taken reasonable efforts to mitigate the loss. Id. § 74(4).
105. See s. ANDERMAN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL 212 (1978).
106. Using this formula and supplying U.S. figures, the U.S. equivalent would be about $19,700,
based on weekly median earnings of $379 for full-time employed men. See BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, supra note 12, Table 4.
107. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 67(2).
108. In 1979, the Conservative government further emphasized this role by introducing a
pre-hearing assessment stage. R. LEWIS & B. SIMPSON, supra note 90, at 58.
109. See Hoffman, Mediation of Unfair Dismissal Grievances: The British Example, 32 PROC.
ANN. MEETING INDUS. REL. RESEARCH Assoc. 171, 173-74 (1979). The figures are approximate;
an average would be misleading because the qualifying service period changed from two years
to 26 weeks to one year during the 1970's. During the period when protection attached after
six months on the job, the number of claims and the number of claimants withdrawing cases
rose significantly. For 1980 statistics, see Lewis, Ten Years of unfair dismissal legislation in Great
Britain, 121 INT'L LAB. REV. 713, 716 (1982).
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ceed to a hearing. 110
C.

Unfair-Dismissal Hearings

Unfair-dismissal complaints are heard by industrial tribunals, which
are tripartite bodies functioning as labor courts. 111 The chairman is
an experienced barrister or solicitor. 1 12 One wingman comes from the
ranks of employers' associations, the other from the unions. 113 The
two wingmen are not expected to act as advocates for their side; rather,
they serve as independent, uncommitted lay judges experienced in industrial relations matters. 114
Hearings before industrial tribunals are designed to be informal, and
the chairman is expected to assist persons unfamiliar with the process.
Representation by lawyers is not typical at these hearings, though some
larger companies routinely use lawyers to represent them. Employers
are often represented by a personnel manager. Complainants may bring
along a shop steward or other union officer, or a friend. Tribunal hearings are short, with most lasting one day or less. Pre-hearing briefs
are not known as such, although a written statement of one or two
pages is sometimes submitted to clarify the issues in a complicated case.
Post-hearing briefs are unknown. In keeping with the public polfoy
of resolving dismissal cases quickly and cheaply, decisions of industrial
tribunals, tend to be short. Attempts to move the system into a more
formal, legalistic mode have been resisted. 11 s
1. Appeals- The losing party may appeal the decision of an m110. See Hoffman, supra note 109, at 173-74.
Ill. See id. at 173. See generally K. WEDDERBURN & P. DAVIES, EMPLOYMENT GRIEVANCES
AND DISPUTES PROCEDURES IN BRITAIN 243-57 (1969).
112. The law profession in Great Britain is bifurcated. Broadly speaking, barristers practice
exclusively as litigators and appellate advocates. Barristers receive their "brief" from solicitors,
lawyers who practice outside the courtroom. The demarcation line has blurred recently, with
both groups permitted to appear before tribunals and the lowest level of criminal court.
113. Non-lawyers are selected to serve on industrial tribunals by the Secretary of State for
Employment from lists of names submitted by various groups, such as employers' associations
and trade unions. These lay persons do not receive full-time appointments. See K. WEDDERBURN
& P. DAVIES, supra note 111, at 247-49.
114. The complainant and respondent in a given case have no control over the composition
of their particular panel. That is determined as an administrative task by the Central Office
of Industrial Tribunals. Assignments to hear particular cases are made on a random basis; no
effort is made to match up the industry background of the wingmen with the industrial setting
of the case. Overall this has a beneficial effect because it ensures that general workplace norms
are applied in determining fairness rather than notions specific to one industry.
115. See, e.g., Retarded Children's Aid Soc'y Ltd. v. Day, 1978 Indus. Cas. R. 437 (declining to overturn a tribunal decision even though a determination on a relevant issue did not appear in the decision). In his separate opinion, Lord Russell of Killowen emphasized that "care
must be taken to avoid concluding that an experienced industrial tribunal by not expressly mentioning some point or breach has overlooked it." Id. at 444. See generally K. WEDDERBURN
& P. DA VIES, supra note I I I, at 258-75. The process may be becoming more formalized, however,
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dustrial tribunal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.' 16 Approximately
four percent of industrial tribunal decisions are appealed.1" Divisions
(panels) of the Employment Appeal Tribunal are also tripartite bodies,
with the chairman a High Court judge. The Employment Appeal
Tribunal reviews only questions of law, though there is some debate
as to whether the main issue in unfair-dismissal cases is a question
of law or fact. 1 ' 8 The Employment Appeal Tribunal, in the interest
of having industrial tribunals throughout the country apply uniform
standards, has indicated that it believes the issue of whether an employer
acted reasonably in dismissing is a question of law. 119 For instance, the
fairness of dismissal for any given offense, such as repeated tardiness
due to transportation difficulties, is considered a question of law, not
fact. How these general standards of fairness apply to a given case,
however, is a question of fact.
Although a judgment of the Employment Appeal Tribunal may be
appealed to the Court of Appeal, and from there to the House of Lords,
higher appeals are unusual. 120 This may stem from the posture of the
Court of Appeal which has tended to back the decisions of industrial
tribunals quite strongly, to the point of insulating them from review
by the Employment Appeal Tribunal. It has done so in the belief ''that
Parliament intended industrial tribunals to resolve dismissal disputes
in a quick, cheap and informal manner, without resort to legal
refinements, and this policy will be undermined if tribunal decisions
are too closely scrutinised." 121 Current American experience certainly
supports the Court of Appeal's view that time-consuming, multi-stage
appeals add little to the determination of the initial factfinder and greatly
detract from the efficacy of the eventual remedy to the employee.
2. Interpretation of the guarantee- Any guarantee of fair dismissal
requires the trier of fact to determine what standards of fairness should
control. In determining whether the employer acted fairly in discharging the complainant, tribunals take into consideration the rulings of
appellate courts and the factors mentioned in the Industrial Relations
simply because legal representation is becoming more common. See Lewis, supra note 109, at
722-23.
116. Under the Industrial Relations Act, 1971, ch. 72, appeal was made to the National Industrial Relations Court. When this court was abolished by the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act, 1974, ch. 52, appeal was made to the High Court. The Employment Appeal Tribunal
was substituted by the Employment Protection Act, 1975, ch. 71.
117. See Phillips, Some Notes on the Employment Appeal Tribunal, 7 INDus. L.J. 137, 141
(1978).
118. See, e.g., Elias, Fairness in Unfair Dismissal: Trends and Tensions, 10 INDUS. L.J. 201,
203 (1981).
I 19. One High Court judge has noted that "it needs to be remembered that cases of dismissal
can be categorised, and that the controversial questions soon become familiar." Phillips, supra
note 117, at 139.
120. Hoffman, supra note 109, at 174.
121. Elias, supra note 118, at 209 & n.40 (citing cases).
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Code of Practice and the ACAS Code of Practice on Disciplinary Practice and Procedures. 122 In addition to explaining the meaning of the
statutory guarantee in a practical way, these Codes discuss what constitutes good industrial relations practice; for instance, that a warning
normally should be given prior to discharge. Not surprisingly, this
general advice has not been sufficient to ~nswer the numerous, recurring questions which arise in dismissal cases.
To avoid having tribunal members asking how they would have acted
in the circumstances, the House of Lords has emphasized that the
tribunal must determine whether the employer acted reasonably in light
of the circumstances as they appeared to that employer at the time
of the dismissal. 123 In making this determination, British tribunals and
courts take the attitude that the statute obliges the employer to act
as the reasonable employer would have acted in the circumstances. As
a result, the decisions of tribunals have become a body of law detailing the bounds of fairness in disciplinary situations.
The British tribunal approaches the issue of whether an employer
acted fairly somewhat differently than an American arbitrator in a union
setting approaches the question of whether an employer had just cause
to discharge. 124 In Britain, the limitations on the employer's right to
discharge flow from the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act
which applies equally to all employers in all industries. Consequently,
greater weight is accorded societal norms relating to the reasonableness
of a given disciplinary response than is given to the actual fairness
of the respondent employer, who may consistently apply more stringent
discipline than the norm. 125 The British experience should therefore
caution the drafters of any American legislation on unfair dismissal
to take into account the orientation of the trier of fact in deciding
the issue of fairness. The attitudes of American labor arbitrators, reflecting the context of very individualized bargaining on discipline, should
not color the application of any generalized American guarantee of
fair dismissal; otherwise, the guarantee itself will be diluted. 126
122. Although not statutes, codes of practice are approved by Parliament and may be introduced in court proceedings as evidence of good industrial relations practice. See P. ELIAS,
8. NAPIER & P. WALLINGTON, LABOUR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 20-21 (1980).
123. W. Devis & Sons Ltd. v. Atkins, [1977] A.C. 931.
124. The American employer's rights in such cases flow from the collective agreement, a
bargain with the union under which the employer retains certain discharge rights. One union
may willingly submit to more stringent discipline than another union. See Koretz & Raobin,
Arbitration & Individual Rights, in THE FUTURE OF -LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 113, 117
(1976).
125. One commentator has observed that the concept of fariness is norm-reflecting rather
than norm-setting. Elias, supra note 118, at 212-13.
126. Labor arbitrators seek to determine what the union has been able to wrest from the
employer's unilateral control. Under a fair-dismissal statute, the power of employees to compel
the employer to concede certain disciplinary issues is irrelevant.
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Accommodating Private Dispute-Resolution Agreements

Under the British legislation, private dispute-resolution arrangements
can be substituted for the statutory provisions if the private procedures
meet certain requirements. Such arrangements are permitted because
both the Labour Party and Conservative Party believe that voluntary
private dispute-resolution mechanisms should be encouraged. Thus, they
are allowed to co-exist alongside the public complaints procedure with
its hearing before a neutral tribunal.
Under section 65 of the Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act,
the employer and union(s) who are signatories to the dispute-resolution
agreement may jointly seek an order allowing their privately established
procedures to substitute for the statutory provisions. 121 If the order
is granted, the statutory provisions will not apply and those covered by
the dispute-resolution agreement will be denied access to the industrial
tribunals. The private agreement must clearly state who is covered and
what procedures will be followed in discharge cases. The procedures must
be available "without discrimination" to all covered employees. 128
Because of the requirements imposed on these substituted private
arrangements, the British government has not defaulted on its obligation under the ILO standards to guarantee all employees protection
against unfair dismissal. For instance, there are two major hurdles most
private agreements fail to surmount. First, the remedies afforded by
the private agreement must be "on the whole as beneficial as (but not
necessarily identical with) those provided" by the statute. 129 Second,
the private agreement must "include a right of arbitration or adjudication by an independent referee, or by a tribunal or other independent
body" in cases where "a decision cannot otherwise be reached." 130
In 1971, the rate of unionization in Britain was much higher than
in the United States, yet highly developed grievance/arbitration procedures were rare. Most private agreements consisted merely of a
grievance procedure, and even these were rarely formalized. Arbitration by a neutral outsider was extremely uncommon. As a result, when
the statute took effect there was no rush by unions and employers to
have their private agreements certified as substitutes for the statutory
provisions, for it was clear that nearly all private agreements fell short
127. Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1978, ch. 44, § 65.
128. Id. § 65(1)(c). In Britain, there is no concept of exclusive representation with the corollary obligation that the union represent all workers in the bargaining unit fairly regardless of
whether an individual belongs to the union. Cf. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) (American
unions, as exclusive representatives, have the duty to represent their members fairly). Traditionally,
British unions have been seen as representing only their own members. Thus, section 65(c) has
the effect of imposing a limited duty of fair representation.
129. Id. § 65(d).
130. Id. § 65(e).
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of the requirements of section 65. 131 To some extent, this parallels the
prevailing American situation. Although non-union companies may have
formal personnel procedures permitting employees to complain that
their discharge was unfair, almost none of these procedures include
any element of impartial review.
Compliance with ILO standards does not require a system of governmental tribunals. Conceivably, a government could meet its ILO obligations by mandating the use of private arbitration to settle discharge
disputes. Most governments in democratic, capitalist countries, however,
would find such a method an unacceptable intrusion into the workings
of the private sector. To provide comprehensive protection against unfair dismissal, a capitalist government must therefore enact statutory
procedures and then include exemptions for private arbitration, with
the expectation that private parties will be motivated to develop their
own arrangements. The British experience, however, indicates that such
expectations are not realistic. Neither the statutory provisions nor the
possibility of exemptions for private agreements spurred the further
development of private agreements which fell a bit short of the section
65 requirements. It seems that once the statutory protection was
available, the need for private arbitration was no longer evident. Even
if employees and employers had wanted to experiment with private
arbitration, the expense involved was seen as too great a disincentive.
Since the passage of the legislation, British unions and employeestaff associations have become actively involved with employers in determining when conduct warrants discipline. Internal grievance procedures
on discipline matters have also become much more refined. Whether
the failure of private parties to use section 65 is a cause for disappointment is thus not clear because the legislation has had the effect
of persuading employers to collaborate voluntarily with their employees
on the setting of disciplinary standards. 132

E.

Impact of Britain's Statutory Guarantee

Since 1971, unfair-dismissal legislation has been strongly supported
by all political parties in Britain. Although there have been political
131. It is not definite whether section 65(e) requires that every discharged person have the
right to go to arbitration if the matter is not settled in the grievance stages. Some commentators
believe that the statute does not require that the union invoked arbitration for every grievant
whose case cannot be settled, as long as the refusal to go to arbitration is based on nondiscriminatory grounds. See, e.g., S. ANDERMAN, supra note 105, at 288-93. Because there have
been very few applications under section 65, there is no body of case law authoritatively interpreting the meaning of section 65(e).
132. Subsequent to the Donovan Report, both major political parties published proposals
for labor legislation. On this issue, the Labour government opined: "[o]ne effect of legislation
will undoubtedly be to encourage the development of clear rules as to the circumstances in which
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differences over the length of service that workers should have with
a company before they qualify for protection under the statute, 133 the
main guarantees and remedies have remained untouched. 134 The cost
of government has been a controversial topic in Britain under the present
Conservative government, but the system of industrial tribunals has
never been a target in a cost-cutting campaign. 135
Perhaps the greatest change wrought by the introduction of protection against unfair dismissal has been in personnel practices. 136 Aware
that they would be liable for unfair dismissal, companies of all sizes
reviewed their procedures on discipline and discharge. In so doing, procedures were written down and personnel managers and supervisors
were instructed on their use. Unions and other employee groups became
involved in the process of formulating disciplinary rules. Employees
became much better informed as to what conduct would warrant
discipline and with what severity. In addition, selection procedures and
on-the-job training practices were improved to avoid employing persons who would not fit in with the employer's needs. Overall, the legislation has motivated employers to arrange their personnel practices so
that the likelihood of imposing arbitrary, inconsistent, or unfair
discipline is greatly reduced. Not only does it grant relief to those unfairly dismissed; it has also minimized employees' chances of being
unfairly dismissed.
III.

A

STATUTORY GUARANTEE FOR THE UNITED STATES

In the past ten years the number of persons advocating that American
employees be protected against unfair dismissal has notably increased.
Some supporters of this protection have argued that the courts should
recognize an implied term in the contract of employment, 137 while others
employees may be dismissed and for what reasons, and the improvement of voluntary procedures."
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EMPLOYMENT, IN PLACE OF STRIFE, CMD. No. 3888, para. 103 (1969).
These expectations have been fulfilled only in part. See Lewis, supra note 109, at 718.
133. See supra note 88. When the qualifying period was raised from 26 weeks to one year
by the Conservative government in 1979, unfair dismissal applications decreased by 200Jo. P.
ELIAS, B. NAPIER & P. WALLINGTON, supra note 122, at 21 n.l.
134. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
135. Handling about 46,000 applications in 1978, the unfair dismissal system as a whole cost
about £5 million (about $10 million). Hoffman, supra note 109, at 173.
136. One result has been professionalization of the personnel management field. Many companies now require or strongly prefer that their personnel managers have passed the examinations of the Institute of Personnel Management, the national professional association. A knowledge
of unfair dismissal law and good disciplinary practice is necessary to pass the written examination.
137. See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 8, at 491-92 (supporting the view that common law
theories, tort as well as contract, should be developed because legislation is unlikely at this time);
Note, Challenging the Employment-At-Will Doctrine Through Modern Contract Theory,, 16 U.
MICH. J .L. REF. 449 (1983) (supporting the view that contract principles should be developed).
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have preferred that legislation, usually federal, be enacted. 138 Both positions, however, have drawbacks.
Having state courts adopt the principle of fair dismissal would, besides
proceeding at a slow rate, result in a lack of uniformity to the extent
each state defined the doctrine differently. Some states might define
the scope of the protection so narrowly as to offer a remedy to only
a small proportion of those unfairly dismissed. Multi-state employers
would have to keep track of varying state developments, thus undermining the practice of standard personnel policies. In addition, protection enforced only by a lawsuit inevitably means expensive, timeconsuming litigation. While upper-level employees might pursue their
remedies through a lawsuit, the rest of the workforce most likely would
find the expense and doubtful outcome of protracted litigation a daunting prospect. 139 Relying on the courts to enforce a right of fair dismissal
would mean that a significant number of unfairly dismissed persons
might never attempt to vindicate their rights.
Federal legislation would certainly apply uniformly throughout the
nation and it might offer comprehensive protection, depending upon
the enforcement mechanism chosen. Its main practical disadvantage,
however, is the improbability that federal legislation on this issue will
be passed in the foreseeable future.
Given the drawbacks in state judicial or federal legislative proposals,
the best solution would be to make state legislation the vehicle for
granting protection against unfair dismissal. The challenge is to devise
a state-based system which will provide a modicum of uniformity
throughout the nation and can be administered at modest cost. This
Article proposes that this can be done by having each state enact a
statutory guarantee against unfair dismissal that would be enforced
through the same procedures presently used for unemployment compensation claims. Under this proposal, costs will be _contained, no additional government bureaucracy need be created, and state courts will
not be flooded with new cases. 1 40
Uniformity in this proposed system would be provided by the use
138. See, e.g., Summers, supra note 8 (favoring legislation); see also Stieber, Protection Against
Unfair Dismissal: A Comparative View, 3 COMP. LAB. L. 229 (1980) (favoring federal legislation); Note, supra note 6 (advocating state legislation).
139. The division of the labor force refers to those below the median wage rate. The median
weekly earnings for full-time employed males are $379; for full-time employed females, the median
weekly earnings are $248. See supra note 12. Unless legal aid is available, it is unlikely that
persons earning less than $20,000 per year who have been recently discharged will retain private
counsel.
140. It is assumed that a fairly high percentage of those discharged from employment presently
file for unemployment compensation benefits. Most employees are aware that persons can
sometimes be qualified to receive benefits even after a discharge. There are no reported statistics
or reliable estimates on the number of persons who do not even file a claim because they are
aware they would be disqualified on the grounds of willful misconduct.
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of existing unemployment insurance programs. All states have unemployment insurance statutes which conform to the requirements of the federal
participatory program. 141 All states have an agency administering their
unemployment compensation system. 142 The state systems typically require that a complaint be filed at a local office and all provide for
a hearing before an agency hearing officer if the claimant is determined to be disqualified. 143 All state systems channel appeals into the
regular state court system. 144 Finally, the grounds for disqualifying persons from receiving unemployment compensation benefits are substantially similar in all states. 145 This remarkable uniformity in state practice sfems from the way in which unemployment protection first arose
m the United States.

A.

Uniformity in the State Systems

In 1933, the United States was one of the few industrialized nations
without any form of unemployment insurance and only five states had
any such program of their own. 146 With unemployment at unprecedented
levels, momentum built up in support of an unemployment insurance
program which culminated in the passage of the Social Security Act
in 1935. 147 By 1937, all forty-eight states, the District of Columbia,
Alaska, and Hawaii had enacted unemployment insurance statutes which
qualified for participation in the new program. 148 Because of the ex141. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSA·
TION: FINAL REPORT, sec. 13.4 (1980).
142. Id. sec. 7.0.
143. Id. sec. 7.3.
144. Id.
145. Id. sec. 4.4.
146. For an exhaustive review of then-existing programs, see A. EPSTEIN, INSECURITY: A
CHALLENGE TO AMERICA (2d rev. ed. 1938).
147. 49 Stat. 639 (codified as amended at Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. §§
3301-3311 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1396m (1976 & Supp IV 1980). The incoming administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt acted quickly to meet this pressing need.
On June 29, 1934, President Roosevelt established the Committee on Economic Security, chaired
by Frances Perkins, Secretary of Labor. A. EPSTEIN, supra note 146, at 672. After extensive
hearings, the commitee issued its final report on January 17, 1935, a report which contained
the main elements of the social security legislation that would be passed within the year. See
generally id. at 684-96.
Because of the urgency of the unemployment situation, Part IX dealing with unemployment
went into effect immediately on January I, 1936. See I. BRODEN, LAW OF SOCIAL SECURITY AND
UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE § 1.04, at JO (1962).
148. See I. BRODEN, supra note 147, § 8.01, at 312-13. Under the Social Security Act of
1935, the unemployment insurance program is a participatory federal scheme. Essentially, it is
a federally aided, state-administered program; the states have great autonomy over their programs. See id. at 311-12. Federal coordination and control are injected into the system, however,
because the Secretary of Labor must determine that a state program is qualified under the Social
Security Act before any provision of federal funds to the state can be authorized. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 501-503 (1977).
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treme rapidity with which the Social Security bill went through Congress and with which the states enacted their own legislation to qualify
for participation in the unemployment insurance program, substantial
reliance was necessarily placed on the recommendations included in
the final report of the Committee on Economic Security. 149 Moved by
the need to act quickly, the states simply incorporated the suggested
factors into their own statutes. As a result, even though each state
has its own legislation, there is great uniformity in the reasons for
disqualification.
The general premise underlying the unemployment compensation program is that persons who are unemployed through no fault of their
own should be provided with government financial assistance to tide
them over until they can find new employment. 1 so To be eligible, the
unemployed person must be able and available for work. Generally,
workers are disqualified from receiving benefits if they refuse suitable
work, voluntarily left work without good cause, were discharged for
misconduct, or are out of work because of a labor dispute. 151 Every
state disqualifies persons unemployed because they were discharged for
work-related misconduct, usually for a wanton or willful disregard of
the employer's interests. 152
1. State unemployment compensation procedures- This Article's
proposal for a statutory guarantee of fair dismissal is designed to incorporate those procedures already utilized by the states in unemployment compensation cases. By having certain procedures serve a dual
function, costs would be contained and the procedural requirements
placed on dismissed workers would be streamlined. A survey of the
current unemployment compensation claims procedure as it operates
in Pennsylvania reveals how such a state agency can be made to serve
more than one purpose. 153
Presently, an employee dismissed in Pennsylvania files for unemployment compensation at the local office of the Bureau of Employment
Security. In so doing, claimants fill out a form giving information concerning their last employment and the reasons for the cessation of that
employment. Claimants are directed to check one of the following as
the reasons for their separation from work: quit, discharged, laidoff, other. Following the filing of the claim, the employer is sent a
149. See A. EPSTEIN, supra note 146, at 732-45.
150. The phrase "through no fault of their own" appears in many state statutes. See, e.g.,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 752 (Purdon 1%4). Because the program was designed to provide
short-term relief only, unemployment benefits terminate at a certain point regardless of whether
the claimant has managed to find a new job.
151. See I. BRODEN, supra note 147, § 8.01, at 312-13.
152. See id. § 12.01, at 468 n. l (citing cases).
153. The unemployment compensation provisions are codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§§ 751-914 (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1981).
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form requesting information such as the claimant's employment dates,
job position, and wages. On this form the employer is asked the reason
for the claimant's separation from employment. When the local Bureau
of Employment Security office receives the employer's form, a telephone
follow-up is made if the employer's information does not correspond
with that given by the claimant. For instance, the employer may have
stated that the claimant quit voluntarily and was not discharged, or
that the claimant was discharged for willful misconduct rather than
that there was no work for the claimant.
At this point the local office of the Bureau of Employment Security
makes a determination of the claimant's eligibility for unemployment
compensation. A notice setting forth the eligibility finding is then mailed
to the parties. If the claimant is disqualified, the Bureau must cite some
reason from the disqualification section of the unemployment compensation statute.1 54 In discharge cases, the usual reason is the willful
misconduct of the employee. 155
If disqualified, the claimant may file a notice of appeal. 1 56 The time
between the filing of the notice and a hearing is relatively short, usually
three weeks. Hearings are conducted by referees of the Unemployment
Compensation Board of Review at the Board offices. The hearings are
informal, and the proceedings are tape recorded. The hearings take
place in small conference rooms, with the referee at the head of the
table and the parties on the opposite sides of the table. Although parties are sometimes represented by lawyers, this is not standard. Companies, especially small employers, are often represented by a personnel manager, sometimes accompanied by a supervisor. Claimants may
come alone, be accompanied by a friend, or be represented by a
paralegal from Community Legal Services. Although claimants are permitted to have private counsel, most appear at the hearing without
counsel.
The referee's decision is issued quickly, often within ten days of the
hearing. The losing party may appeal to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. In filing a notice of appeal, no reason for
appeal need be given. After the notice is filed, a transcript of the proceedings is made from the tape recording. The parties receive a copy
of the transcript free of charge. The parties file written briefs which
are important because oral argument before the Board of Review is
154. The list of statutory reasons can be found at id. § 802.
155. Willful misconduct is behavior which evidences (I) wanton and willful disregard of the
employer's interests, (2) deliberate violation of rules, (3) disregard of standards of behavior which
an employer can reasonably expect from an employee, or (4) negligence which manifests culpability,
wrongful intent, evil design, or intentional and substantial disregard for the employer's interests
or the employee's duties and obligations. Frick v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 31
Pa. Commw. 198, 375 A.2d 879 (1977).
156. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 822 (Purdon 1964).
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rare. The Board normally makes its decision on the basis of the record
and the briefs. 157
Either party can appeal to Pennsylvania's Commonwealth Court
within thirty days of receiving the Board of Review's decision. 158 The
court's scope of review is limited to two questions: whether the Board
of Review's decision was supported by evidence in the record and
whether the Board's decision was within its statutory authority. 159 Decisions of the Commonwealth Court may be appealed to the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court but appeals in discharge cases are rare.
2. Issues raised in unemployment cases- Before turning to a discussion of how unemployment claims procedures can accommodate the
administration of state legislative protection against unfair dismissal,
it is important to consider the issues referees are called upon to decide
in discharge cases. Because the courts have distinguished a valid basis
for discharge by an employer from willful misconduct which disqualifies
a claimant from receiving unemployment compensation, it might be
inferred that labor arbitrators and unemployment compensation referees
are accustomed to approaching discharge cases in very different ways. 160
This is not, however, the case; referees applying the standards of the
unemployment compensation statute frequently employ the same method
of analysis as that used by arbitrators deciding whether an employer
had just cause to discharge under a collective bargaining agreement. 161
A few examples can illustrate this point. Arbitrators often find that
discharge was unjust because the seriousness of the offense did not
warrant such severe discipline. Similarly, a single act of serious misconduct may constitute willful misconduct disqualifying the claimant from
benefits, 162 but a single, minor, and casual act of negligence or
carelessness may not. 163 Foreknowledge of the consequences of an act
is a factor considered by arbitrators in determining whether a discharge
was just. Similarly, an employee may not be found to have engaged

157. The Board of Review may remand for more testimony if a relevant issue was not addressed at the hearing. Id. § 824.
158. Id. § 830.1.
159. Id.
160. Theoretically, in determining whether the discharge should be upheld, arbitrators ask
only whether the employer had just cause for discharge. Under this approach, the willfulness
of the employee behavior is irrelevant; only the effect of the misconduct is important.
161. Professor Clyde Summers has noted that there is a broad consensus among arbitrators
on the underlying principles that should be applied in discipline and discharge cases. See Summers, supra note 8, at 501. See also Stieber, supra note 138, at 237-38.
162. See, e.g., Askew v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 56 Pa.
Commw. 260, 424 A.2d 608 (1981); Schaefer v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Review, 32 Pa. Commw. 200, 378 A.2d 1044 (1977).
163. See, e.g., Coulter v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 16 Pa.
Commw. 462, 332 A.2d 876 (1975); Loder v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of
Review, 6 Pa. Commw. 484, 296 A.2d 297 (1972).
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in willful misconduct when there was no warning about the consequences
of the act and the seriousness of the offense was not readily apparent. 164
Arbitrators will apply elementary notions of fairness in determining
whether a discharge was just, such as asking whether discipline was
evenly imposed or whether the employer's policy on discipline could
be viewed as rational. Similarly, courts have refused to find willful
misconduct disqualifying when employers were inconsistent in their application of discipline 165 or when their disciplinary policy punished someone innocent of misconduct. 166 The reasonableness of a supervisor's
order and the reasonableness of the employee's refusal to obey that
order are issues considered by both arbitrators and referees. 161 The approach of arbitrators and referees is also similar when the employer's
asserted reason for discharge, an admitted act of misconduct, appears
to be mere pretext. 168
Over the range of discharge cases, unemployment compensation
referees are applying many of the concepts of fairness developed by
labor arbitrators under the just cause standard. There is one type of
case, however, where the standards applied by referees and arbitrators
are quite different. This occurs when an employee, though acting in
good faith, cannot perform assigned tasks in a satisfactory manner.
This may be due to mental or physical inability, or to factors such
as transportation difficulties and family responsibilities which prevent
the employee from regularly appearing at work on time. Arbitrators
in these cases would find that the employer had just cause for discharge.
Unemployment compensation referees, however, would find that the
employee's discharge had not stemmed from willful misconduct and
would therefore allow compensation.
164. See, e.g., O'Keefe v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 18 Pa.
Commw. 151, 333 A.2d 815 (1975) (employees did not realize they were not allowed to eat stale
pastries).
165. See, e.g., Woodson v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 461 Pa.
439, 336 A.2d 867 (1975).
166. In Paige v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 39 Pa. Commw.
141, 394 A.2d 1318 (1978), the employer discharged both persons engaged in a fight after work
in the employee washroom. The court refused to disqualify the claimant from receiving benefits,
because the unrebutted evidence indicated that the claimant was not the aggressor and could
not have avoided the aggressor. Id. at 1319.
167. See, e.g., Robertson v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 53 Pa.
Commw. 307,417 A.2d 293 (1980) (holding that a blanket refusal by employee to work overtime
was unreasonable and constituted willful misconduct); cf. Horace W. Longacre, Inc. v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 12 Pa. Commw. 176, 316 A.2d 110 (1974)
(holding that employee who was going off on break time and refused order to return to work
was reasonable in doing so and not disqualified).
168. See, e.g., Panaro v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 51 Pa.
Commw. 19, 413 A.2d 772 (1980) (employee misconduct was so removed in time from the date
of discharge as to cast doubt on the employer's assertion that the discharge was based on the
misconduct).
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Defining the Statutory Guarantee

The core element of this Article's proposal is a statute enacted in
every state which provides simply that ''every employee has the right
to be dismissed fairly and for just cause." No complex statutory formula is required to provide effective protection against unfair dismissal,
as several decades of experience in the unionized sector demonstrate.
Indeed, thousands of collective bargaining agreements in the United
States contain a clause which states simply that the employer has the
right to discharge "for just cause." 169 When an employee covered by
a collective agreement is discharged, the union may challenge the
management action by asserting that the employer lacked just cause
to discharge the employee. In applying the just cause standard, arbitrators ask not only whether the employer had a substantively valid
basis for the discharge, but also whether the employer followed fair
procedures in the circumstances. 110
One attractive feature of the just cause standard is its straightforward and non-technical nature. By understanding the substantive standard, those closest to the discharge (the supervisor, the employee, the
union representative) can readily apply the standard to the circumstances
and gauge the likelihood that an arbitrator will uphold the discharge.
In many instances, the employee and the union will realize they have
no substantial case against the employer and will not process the
grievance through to arbitration, thereby not burdening the system or
incurring unnecessary costs. This self-assessment of the merits of the
case is a vitally important feature of the easily comprehensible standard. Not only does it reduce the caseload of arbitrators, it does so
without sacrificing the confidence of employees in that process established to enforce their rights. Therefore, drafters of state legislation
should avoid unnecessarily legalistic language. Rather, they should ensure that the phrasing of the statutory guarantee is easily understood
by those it is designed to protect.
1. Complaints procedure- Any claim of unfair dismissal under
the state statute should be filed within ten weeks of termination, unless
the claimant works under a collective bargaining agreement. As will
be discussed, the filing deadline should be extended for those in this
latter category. 111 The most efficient system in terms of cost to the
state and burden on the claimant would be to have complaints of un169. Estimates vary but the lowest estimate is that at least 80% of collective agreements provide that the employer can discharge only "for just cause" or "for cause." 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS & CONT. (BNA) 40:1 (1979).
170. For a brief discussion of the principles of procedural fairness applied by arbitrators,
see Summers, supra note 8, at 503-04.
171. See infra text following note 185.
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fair dismissal made at the same time the discharged person files for
unemployment compensation at the local office of the state agency.
When claimants check off "discharged" on the claim form as the reason
for their separation from work, the agency employee should ask whether
they will also be claiming that they have been unfairly discharged. An
explanation of the right to be dismissed fairly and for just cause should
be provided at that time, either by the agency employee or by providing claimants with a pamphlet containing the relevant information.
This explanation might include the names of specialized agencies empowered to deal with complaints that a discharge was based, for example, on union activity or race discrimination.
In many cases involving alleged misconduct, the claimant will be
found guilty of misconduct and thus ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits, with the case proceeding to a hearing only if the
claimant wishes to press the matter. If an employee is claiming unfair
dismissal, on the other hand, the case must proceed to a hearing so
that the referee can decide the fairness issue and determine an appropriate remedy. Hence, it is essential that a local-office employee
explain to claimants in these cases that their claim has two distinct
aspects with different procedures for each.
2. Application of the guarantee- When a claim for unemployment
compensation from a discharged employee is filed, state unemployment compensation referees currently must scrutinize the employer's
reason for discharging the claimant. 112 In nearly all cases, the conduct
of the employee is at issue. If the referee determines that the employee
was discharged for willful misconduct, the employee will be denied
unemployment compensation. The inconsistency between current
unemployment compensation standards and the arbitral just cause standard mainly arises when an employer has good reason to discharge
an employee not guilty of willful misconduct. For example, consider
a case where a mother frequently is absent from work because of a
sick child and alternative child-care arrangements cannot be made. An
employer is certainly entitled to discharge a person who is repeatedly
absent from work because the needs of the business demand that the
job be performed. It is equally clear, however, that the woman has
not acted willfully to destroy the employment relationship. Accordingly, the state referee would determine that the woman is entitled to
unemployment benefits for there is no reason to deny her the safety
net of unemployment compensation. Nevertheless, the employer did
have just cause to discharge the woman.
This factual situation illustrates that state unemployment compensation referees will need to make two separate inquiries in discharge
172.

See supra text accompanying notes 152-58.
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cases: first, whether the employee caused his or her own discharge
through willful misconduct, and, second, whether the employer acted
fairly and had just cause for discharge. 173 Referees are already skilled
in making the first determination. The standards used in making the
second determination are not alien to referees, though many referees
may not be entirely familiar with them. A short course on the just
cause standard should be more than sufficient to acquaint referees,
already familiar with discharge cases, with the nuances of the new standard. Some states may choose to have only a portion of their referees
trained to decide unfair-dismissal cases. With less than a full complement of referees specializing in unfair-dismissal cases, the cost of these
training seminars can be minimized.
Courses designed to educate unemployment compensation referees
on the just cause standard should be easy to develop. Arbitrator training programs 174 have already devised course materials and several excellent text references are currently on the market. 175 Thus, the cost
of developing courses and course materials should be modest. States
could instead commission experienced arbitrators on a fixed-fee basis
to hear unfair-dismissal cases, thereby obviating the need for training
any referees.
3. Remedies- Effective remedies are essential to the success of any
system seeking to provide comprehensive and speedy protection against
unfair dismissal. In labor arbitration, reinstatement is the standard
remedy. 1 76 There is no damages award, but reinstated employees may
receive backpay for the time they were out of work. Under this Article's proposed state statute, reinstatement to the former job or re-employment with the same employer in another job should be permitted, but
only in those instances where the claimant and the employer accept
it as a remedy and the hearing referee determines that it would be appropriate in the circumstances. In reinstatement cases the claimant
should receive backpay for the period between the date of discharge
and the date of re-employment.
173. In most cases of willful misconduct, it will be found that the employer had just cause
to discharge. There may be cases, however, where certain misconduct typically has been ignored
at the workplace. It would be unfair for an employer to discharge an employee for an offense
usually overlooked. Even under the willful misconduct standard it has been held that an employee
could not have intended to commit an offense punishable by discharge in such circumstances
and thus was qualified to receive unemployment compensation benefits. See Woodson v. Commonwealth Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 461 Pa. 439, 336 A.2d 867 (1975).
174. The Labor and Employment Section of the American Bar Association has a pilot
arbitrator-training program. The New York State School of Industrial Relations at Cornell University has a similar program. Both are designed for persons with little or no arbitration experience.
Many business and law schools offer courses on arbitration.
175. See, e.g., F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 612-14 (3d ed. 1973);
0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed. )983).
176. See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, supra note 175, at 648.
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Although reinstatement is the standard remedy in labor arbitration,
it should be used sparingly in non-union settings. Even for unionized
employees, reinstatement should not be the automatic remedy.
Employees who have been discharged and had their union support their
grievance can expect the union's solidarity to provide them organized
support once they are back on the job. A worker in a non-union setting, however, may find the former workplace a hostile environment,
with co-workers wary of siding with someone so clearly out of favor
as to be fired. Even a unionized employee, especially in white-collar
settings, may find it difficult to resume employment if the atmosphere
at the workplace is similar to that preceding the discharge. Hence,
referees must be aware that a short period of re-employment is rarely
an effective remedy. It is usually preferable to award damages and
have the claimant start afresh in a new job.
The standard remedy under this Article's proposed statutory system
would be a monetary award, paid by the employer directly to the
employee. This award would have two components, a basic award and
a compensatory award. All workers found to have been unfairly dismissed would receive a basic award calculated according to a statutory
formula. The statutory formula would provide for an amount based
on length of service, perhaps one week's pay for each year of service,
with a minimum award of one month's pay. The compensatory award
would be awarded only at the referee's discretion and would compensate the employee for any actual loss suffered, but only to the extent
that the basic award is considered inadequate compensation. The referee
should take into account factors such as loss of pension rights, impact
of loss of seniority in taking a new job, emotional distress, and similar
items. The referee should also take into account whether the basic award
is too small an amount to restrain employers from discharging unfairly.
This might be a problem with newer employees because employers may
find it worthwhile to discharge them arbitrarily if the only cost is payment of a small basic award. There should be a statutory ceiling on
the compensatory award, perhaps one year's salary or an amount equaling the national median salary of a full-time employee. 1 77
Whether any compensatory award would be appropriate for a
reinstated claimant would be a matter for each state to decide. In cases
where the unfairly discharged employee suffered substantial emotional
distress, for example, after being accused of an offense such as theft
or drug usage, reinstatement with backpay is hardly an adequate remedy
177. Because claimants must state what their wages were at the time of separation when filing for unemployment compensation and employers verify this information, there should be no
difficulty in using the employee's wages in making these calculations. If a national median figure
were used, the monthly information issued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor could be used as an update.
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and compensatory awards should be permitted. Similarly, the state may
decide that receipt of both the basic award and unemployment compensation benefits would be double-dipping, and modify the benefits
period to exclude the initial period of unemployment that the basic
award is designed to cover. 118
Although the amounts provided under the proposed system do not
match those some juries might award in particularly emotionally appealing cases, discharged employees as a group should prefer the predictability of the award and the prompt, inexpensive resolution of their
complaint. Because the aim of the statute is to guarantee protection
against unfair dismissal, the amounts suggested should provide a financial disincentive sufficient to dissuade employers from terminating
employees without cause. In addition, the amounts suggested would
in most cases provide adequate compensation for actual loss suffered,
assuming that most discharged persons can find another job within
a year. Finally, it is not unreasonable to exclude the possibility of excessive, windfall jury awards. To do otherwise and permit resort to
the courts could undermine the uniformity, comprehensiveness, and
predictability of the proposed statutory system.
4. Coverage- In keeping with the basic premise of the ILO Convention that a government should guarantee protection for all workers,
no category of employees should be excluded unless it has been
guaranteed equivalent protection under another statute. In particular,
lower- and middle-level managers responsible for devising and implementing the employer's policies should not be excluded on grounds
that they are agents of the employer. The belief that managers need
no protection is outdated, as any survey of cases challenging the
employment-at-will doctrine reveals. This broad protection readily blends
into the framework of the statutory proposal, because the coverage
already required by the federal unemployment compensation participatory program is extremely broad, with agricultural workers the
main category likely to be excluded. 1 79
States may wish to exclude from coverage those persons who have
been with the employer for only a short time. In effect, such an exclusion is a realistic acknowledgment that a new worker may not fit as
planned into the organization. Because this usually becomes apparent
within six months to a year, the exclusion should not be extended to
178. If a person is unemployed for a long period of time, unemployment benefits may run
out. The state may therefore wish to tack an equivalent period on to the end of the benefits
period. For example, if a person has been employed for 10 years and is unfairly dismissed, the
basic award would be the equivalent of 10 weeks of pay. The state might require that the claimant
return the unemployment compensation benefits received for the first 10 weeks of unemployment. In calculating the claimant's eligibility for benefits, the state would thus count the person's eleventh week of unemployment as week one.
179. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, supra note 141, sec. 3.0.
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employees with more than one year of service. Without this exclusion,
protection would attach from the first day and some employers might
hesitate to hire a new worker unless they were certain they would be
satisfied with the applicant's performance. To encourage employers
to hire, it may therefore be necessary to give employers some leeway
to discharge during the first few months of employment; however, care
should be taken that this right to discharge at will is not abused. 180
An exclusion for low-service employees effectively leaves workers
in high turnover and seasonal industries without protection. Because
employees in these industries are often poorly paid, they are unlikely
to be able to fight effectively against unfair or discriminatory
discharge. 181 Hence, any exclusionary clause based on length of service should be carefully scrutinized to determine if it will exclude those
most in need of protection.
C.

Interface with Arbitration

The states should exclude from the benefit of the statutory system
only those persons who have access to a private dispute-resolution system
which on the whole is as favorable as, though not necessarily identical
to, the state system. To so qualify, the private system must guarantee
the discharged worker three things: first, the right to be dismissed
fairly and for just cause; second, the right' to a hearing before a neutral
arbitrator; 182 and third, the right to receive adequate remedies, such
as reinstatement with backpay. If these criteria are met, the state can
certify the private system as an alternative forum for the resolution
of discharge cases.
Most often mentioned in this regard is the system of labor arbitration whereby employers having unionized employees agree that disputes
over discipline and discharge may be resolved through a grievance and
arbitration procedure. 183 Arbitration is an approved method of dispute
180. The probationary period need not be as long as one year. State legislatures may find
six months sufficient. The British practice indicates that a shorter probationary period compelled
employers to consider their needs and the aptitude of the job applicants more carefully, thus
improving hiring policies.
181. See, e.g., Heason, Laboring: At fast-food chains, the help is low-priced, too, Philadelphia
Inquirer, Jan. 17, 1983, at 1 (noting fast-food industry turnover of 300% a year).
182. To be neutral, the arbitrator must be an outsider to the company, and must be selected
by both the employer and the employee. Arbitrators paid by one side only would not be considered neutral. Although presently rare, this does occur when a nonunion company voluntarily
chooses to have an outsider arbitrate a dispute.
183. Most agreements have a multi-step procedure whereby the grieyance is considered by
union and management representatives, starting at the lowest level and working upwards. Arbitration is the final step and usually the union must invoke that step in writing. Not all grievances
are arbitrable, depending upon the scope of the arbitration clause in the contract. For a concise
description of the operation of the grievance procedure, see A. Cox, D. BoK & R. GORMAN,
LABOR LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 513-53 (9th ed. 1981).
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resolution under the ILO Convention, but only if the arbitration procedure provides for a guaranteed right to a hearing. 184 Most
grievance/arbitration procedures in collective bargaining agreements
fail to meet this requirement. A hearing only occurs when the union
invokes the last stage of the arbitration process; however, the union
has discretion to decide not to take a case to arbitration if the chances
of winning appear to be low. 185
Recognizing that grievance/arbitration procedures are part of the
fabric of the labor-management relationship, state statutes should provide that persons who can utilize such a procedure not be allowed to
file under the state system until the private procedure has been completed. If the grievance procedure has been completed and the discharged
person's case has not gone to arbitration, the discharged person should
then be allowed to file a claim with the state system. This filing should
be required to be made within one month of the completion of the
last step of the grievance procedure.
This accommodation between the private labor-arbitration system
and the state unfair-dismissal system should satisfy employers who object
to employees getting "two bites at the apple." In addition, unions should
not be unduly worried that the state system will somehow diminish
the attractiveness of unionization to the average employee. First, private
arbitration will be preserved and, in most instances, will probably offer justice more closely tailored to the standards of the individual
workplace. Second, should a case not go to arbitration, employees m;iy
seek the assistance of their union at the hearing before the unemployment compensation referee. In Britain, having the union provide someone to represent the member at the tribunal hearing is seen as an
important benefit of union membership.
From a union's viewpoint, providing the union member with a lawyer
at the state hearing, rather than taking the case to arbitration, is the
less expensive alternative. 186 A union which loses a fair representation
suit may be liable for a portion of the damages awarded the discharged
worker, even where the employer is solely responsible for the discharge
and where the union acted in good faith. 187 A union confronted by
a weak discharge case faces a dilemma: either it accepts the expense
of going to an arbitration it will probably lose or it risks a potentially
costly fair representation suit. The decision to utilize the state system
would probably protect a union that fails to invoke arbitration from
allegations by its members that the union breached its duty of fair
184.
185.
186.
it must
187.

See Convention, supra note 2, art. 8(1).
See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191-93 (1967) (noting that this is accepted practice).
In a typical arbitration, for instance, the union must pay not only for its lawyer's time,
also pay one-half of the arbitrator's fee.
See Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv., 103 S. Ct. 588 (1983); see also infra note 189.
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r~presentation. 188 This would mean that the employer alone would bear
the cost of unfairly dismissing an employee, something not found in
present law. 189

D.

Potential Impact of an American Statutory Guarantee

In view of American employer resistance to the erosion of the
employment-at-will doctrine, one might conclude that a statutory
guarantee of fair dismissal was somehow detrimental to business. Yet,
it is difficult to envision how such a guarantee could harm companies.
If, as commonly claimed, most employers already use fair personnel
practices, the enactment of a fair-dismissal statutory guarantee should
have no impact whatever because a finding of unfair dismissal would
be a rarity. Some employers may not intend to dismiss unfairly but
lack sound personnel policies designed for consistent application; hence,
discipline may be meted out unevenly and, therefore, unfairly. In these
circumstances, referees might hold that the employer dismissed unfairly
under the statutory guarantee and award damages according to the
statutory formula. Such determinations should persuade these employers
to re-evaluate their personnel policies and codify their fair practices
into a statement of official personnel policy. Both employees and supervisors would then have guidance on disciplinary standards and there
should be fewer instances of unfair dismissal.
Of course, a few employers may wish to control their workforce
in an autocratic fashion, and retain the right to fire their workers
regardless of the absence of valid grounds for discharge. Considerations of equity demand that such situations be rectified. Yet, equity
need not be gained at the expense of efficiency for it is highly unlikely
that such employers run a cost-efficient operation. A workforce subject to erratic and arbitrary discharge is almost certain to have a poor
productivity and quality-control record. 190 Employers who hire workers
188. Small local unions which hesitate to send a weak case to arbitration because of the
financial expense involved often worry about the cost of defending against a fair representation
suit. See T. BOYCE, FAIR REPRESENTATION, THE NLRB, AND THE COURTS 68 (1978). On the plight
of financially constrained unions, see 35 PROC. ANN. MEETING INDUS. REL. RESEARCH Assoc.
(1983) (comments of Joyce Miller, vice president of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers'
Union, concerning the current state of arbitration).
189. Bowen v. U.S. Postal Serv.'. 103 S.Ct. 588 (1983). In Bowen, an employee was dismissed
after an altercation at work. The union processed his grievance through the steps of the procedure, but the national union failed to take the case to arbitration. The Supreme Court held
that a union could be held liable for the part of the employee's backpay even though the employer
was solely responsible for the unfair dismissal. Id. at 595. For a discussion of the practical impact of this case, see When a Union Fails to Push a Grievance, Bus. WK., Feb. 14, 1983, at 130E.
190. Current interest in Japanese management practices has led some American employers
to introduce personnel programs, such as quality circles, as part of a policy of upgrading productivity and quality control through improving employee morale. Building an employer-employee
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casually and then fire those who were erroneously hired unnecessarily
incur all the costs associated with employee turnover. The enactment
of a statutory guarantee could have a positive impact on such employers
by influencing them to adopt rational disciplinary standards.
CONCLUSION

The United States should act now to conform to world standards
on unfair dismissal, standards that other highly industrialized nations
have managed to implement. The experience of Great Britain
demonstrates that establishing a statutory guarantee and creating a
system to enforce that right need not disrupt labor-management relations, nor must it be expensive and highly legalistic to be effective.
Moreover, the British legislation has had the salutary effect of encouraging employers to improve their disciplinary policies and procedures.
This Article has proposed a system, in many ways similar to the
British system, that would conform to world standards on unfair
dismissal and provide a modicum of uniformity throughout the nation, while placing control firmly at the state level. The proposed system
would use existing state unemployment compensation procedures, thus
providing comprehensive coverage at modest additional cost. This
modest cost and worker familiarity with hearing procedures should encourage a high proportion of those unfairly dismissed to avail themselves
of the opportunity to challenge their dismissal. In addition, the right
to be dismissed fairly and for just cause is a guarantee already familiar
to labor relations practitioners and readily understood by employees.
Those criticizing the enactment of statutory protection against unfair dismissal often focus on the difficulties of guaranteeing such a
right - especially the cost. Although cost estimates are not given, these
critics assume costs will be unacceptably high, whatever the figure. Supporters of a statutory guarantee assert that a democratic society should
not tolerate fundamental inequity merely because of the cost of
eliminating the injustice. Although this latter position has merit, it fails
to respond to an issue of critical concern to legislators: the feasibility
of new fiscal expenditure in a decade of cutbacks in public service.
One of the most important features of this Article's proposed statutory
system is its modest additional cost to the public. It would not require
a new bureaucracy, nor would it demand the hiring of many new
employees to cope with an increased caseload. Rather, it would make
additional use of an existing state agency, requiring certain employees
relationship based on fair treatment is seen as essential to the success of such efforts. See generally
B. Fisher, Remarks at the Meeting of the Philadelphia Chapter of the Industrial Relations Research
Association (Oct. 13, 1981), reprinted in 108 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 168 (1981).
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to perform one new task, at little extra cost. Finally, although enactment of federal legislation on unfair dismissal in the current political
atmosphere is highly unlikely, this Article proposes that a high degree
of national uniformity can still be achieved merely by requiring each
state to enact legislation guaranteeing the same right and providing
for enforcement of the right through the same agency in each state.
The pro-business political climate arising out of the current recession should not be hostile to such legislation. Some critics claim that
the cost of complying with employment protection legislation, when
no similar burden is placed on employers in other countries, is one
reason why American business is uncompetitive. Even if somewhat valid
in other contexts, this criticism certainly does not apply here. The protection against unfair dismissal typically granted in nearly all advanced
industrial societies far exceeds the protection currently afforded American
workers. Thus, if fair-dismissal legislation were enacted, American
employers would not be operating at a competitive disadvantage in
this area. That American multinational corporations routinely comply
with these standards in their overseas operations indicates that imposing such standards on employers in this country would not harm
American business.
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